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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jeremy Todd Hill filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After the district court 
gave notice of its intent to dismiss the petition for being untimely filed, Mr. Hill asserted 
that equitable tolling applied to his petition, because he was denied his constitutional 
right of access to the courts. The district court nonetheless dismissed the petition with 
prejudice on the ground that the action was untimely, after determining that the doctrine 
of equitable tolling did not apply to Mr. Hill's petition. 
Mr. Hill appealed, asserting that the district court erred when it dismissed his 
petition, because he was denied his right of access to the courts and equitable tolling 
therefore applies. 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that Mr. Hill's claimed basis for 
equitable tolling based on the adequacy of the prison law library is not preserved for 
appeal, or, alternatively, that the district court correctly concluded that Mr. Hill was not 
entitled to equitable tolling. (Resp. Br., pp.11-23.) 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's arguments. The question of 
whether the prison law library is inadequate is preserved for appeal. Mr. Hill's right of 
access to the courts was denied because the State failed to furnish an adequate law 
library or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law, and Mr. Hill suffered an 
actual injury as a result of those deficiencies. Thus, equitable tolling applies to Mr. Hill's 
post-conviction petition, and the district court erred when it dismissed with prejudice 
the petition. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Hill's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it dismissed, with prejudice, Mr. Hill's petition for post-
conviction relief, because Mr. Hill was denied his right of access to the courts and 
equitable tolling therefore applies? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Dismissed, With Prejudice, Mr. Hill's Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief, Because Mr. Hill Was Denied His Right Of Access To The Courts And 
Equitable Tolling Therefore Applies 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Hill asserts that the statute of limitations on his petition for post-conviction 
relief should be equitably tolled because he was denied his right of access to the courts. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the right of access to the courts 
requires the State to confer the "capability of bringing contemplated challenges to 
sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts," through providing inmates 
with either "adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the 
law." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). If 
an inmate's right of access to the courts was denied, equitable tolling applies to the 
statute of limitations in the inmate's post-conviction proceeding. See State v. Ochieng, 
147 Idaho 621, 626 (Ct. App. 2009). In this case, the prison law library did not provide 
inmates with access to case law. The prison "paralegals" were prohibited from giving 
any legal advice to inmates. Thus, the State did not furnish adequate law libraries or 
adequate legal assistance, and Mr. Hill was denied his constitutional right of access to 
the courts. Because Mr. Hill was denied his right of access to the courts, equitable 
tolling applies to his post-conviction petition. The district court therefore erred when it 
dismissed with prejudice Mr. Hill's post-conviction petition. 
8. Standard Of Review 
As a matter of clarification, the district court dismissed Mr. Hill's post-conviction 
petition after an evidentiary hearing. (R., pp.259-60, 266-77.) "When reviewing a 
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decision denying post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, an appellate court 
will not disturb the lower court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous." 
Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 862 (Ct. App. 2010). The appellate court "exercises 
free review of the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts." Id. 
C. The Question Of Whether The Prison Law Library Is Inadequate Is Preserved 
For Appeal 
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Hill asserts that the question of whether the prison 
law library is inadequate is preserved for appeal. The State argues this Court should 
not consider whether the prison law library is inadequate, because Mr. Hill did not raise 
that issue before the district court. (Resp. Br., pp.13-15.) While the State's point that 
"issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be addressed" is well taken, see 
Weller v. State, 146 Idaho 652, 655 (Ct. App. 2008), Mr. Hill actually raised the 
adequacy of the law library before the district court as an aspect of his equitable 
tolling issue. 
Mr. Hill's equitable tolling issue raised the adequacy of the law library. In 
Mr. Hill's reply to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss the post-conviction 
petition, he stated that "it is clear that the Petitioner has presented claims which would 
call for equitable tolling of a period of time in excess of 100 days, and therefore the 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief is timely filed and should be heard by this Court." In 
support of that statement, he asserted that, for "approximately 70 to 110 days, the 
Petitioner could not file a Petition for Post Conviction Relief because there [were] no 
legal reference materials available to him." (R., p.191.) 
Further, Mr. Hill asserted that, 
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It is the position of the Petitioner that during the 70 to approximately 110 
days that he was denied access to his own legal documents, and denied 
access to the laws of the State of Idaho, and denied access to ANY case 
precedent, that he is also entitled to equitable tolling during this period 
of time. 
(R., p.192.) Mr. Hill then cited Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530 (Ct. App. 1997), for the 
proposition that "the time period during which an inmate does not have available to him 
the necessary legal reference materials from the State of Idaho, which are necessary to 
file a Petition for Post Conviction Relief[,] is to be tolled during this time period." 
(R., p.192.) In Martinez, the Idaho Court of Appeals held "that Art. I,§ 18 of the Idaho 
Constitution imposes the same requirement for provision of adequate prison law 
libraries or adequate legal assistance that the United States Supreme Court articulated 
in Bounds as a requirement of the Due Process Clause." Martinez, 130 Idaho at 536. 
Because Mr. Hill highlighted the lack of access to legal reference materials and the 
denial of access to Idaho state laws and any case precedent as grounds for equitable 
tolling, he raised the question of whether the prison law library was inadequate. 
Because Mr. Hill actually raised the adequacy of the law library before the district 
court, this case is distinguishable from Weller. In Weller, the petitioner "did not respond 
to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss with evidence or argument as to why his 
petition should not be dismissed as untimely. He did not assert to the district court that 
the statute of limitation should be tolled for any reason." Weller, 146 Idaho at 655. 
Because an appellate court would not address issues raised for the first time on appeal, 
and because an appellate court is not the place for factual assertions, the Idaho Court 
of Appeals held that, "to the extent that [the petitioner] attempts to argue on appeal a 
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basis to toll the statute of limitation, we will not consider it because that issue is raised 
for the first time on appeal." Id. 
Unlike the petitioner in Weller, Mr. Hill responded to the district court's notice of 
intent to dismiss with evidence and argument as to why his petition should not be 
dismissed as untimely. (R., pp.189-193.) Additionally, in contrast to the petitioner in 
Weller, Mr. Hill asserted to the district court that the statute of limitations should be 
tolled on the basis of equitable tolling. (R., pp.191-92.) This case is therefore 
distinguishable from Weller. Mr. Hill actually raised the adequacy of the law library 
before the district court as an aspect of his equitable tolling issue. Thus, the question of 
whether the prison law library is inadequate is preserved for appeal. 
D. Equitable Tolling Applies To The Statute Of Limitations In Mr. Hill's Post-
Conviction Proceeding, Because Mr. Hill's Right Of Access To The Courts 
Was Denied 
Mr. Hill submits that equitable tolling applies to his post-conviction petition, 
because he was denied his right of access to the courts. The State argues that Mr. Hill 
has not shown that the district court erred when it determined that Mr. Hill did not 
"establish sufficient tolling" to avoid dismissal of his post-conviction petition as untimely. 
(Resp. Br., p.16.) In support of this contention, the State argues that Mr. Hill has not 
shown that the prison law library or legal assistance program were inadequate, or that 
he suffered any actual injury as a result of the alleged shortcomings. (Resp. Br., pp.17-
23.) Contrary to the State's arguments, Mr. Hill's right of access to the courts was 
denied because the State failed to furnish an adequate law library or adequate 
assistance from persons trained in the law, and Mr. Hill suffered an actual injury as a 
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result of those deficiencies. Thus, equitable tolling applies to Mr. Hill's post-conviction 
petition, and the district court erred when it dismissed with prejudice the petition. 
1. The State Failed To Furnish An Adequate Law Library Or Adequate 
Assistance From Persons Trained In The Law 
Mr. Hill asserts that the State failed to furnish an adequate law library or 
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. The right of access to the courts 
requires the State to confer the "capability of bringing contemplated challenges to 
sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts," through providing inmates 
with either "adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the 
law." Lewis, 518 U.S. 343; Bounds, 430 U.S. 817. 
Mr. Hill asserts that the State failed to furnish an adequate law library because it 
did not provide inmates with access to case law. The State argues that "case reporters" 
are not constitutionally required for a prison law library to be adequate. (Resp. 
Br., pp.17-18.) However, the lack of access to case law precludes the State from 
conferring the guaranteed "capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences 
or conditions of confinement before the courts." See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356. 
As Mr. Hill has previously discussed (App. Br., pp.18-19), the lack of access to 
case law precludes the State from conferring the guaranteed "capability of filing suit," 
see Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356, because the lack of access to case law prevents inmates 
from knowing and understanding vital legal concepts such as the time requirements or 
limitations periods for filing claims they wish to pursue. (See Tr., p.55, Ls.10-17.) Some 
time requirements or limitations periods are found in case law, not in statutes. (See 
Tr., p.55, Ls.10-17.) The case law containing those time requirements and limitations is 
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therefore among the "tools [Bounds] requires to be provided," because inmates need 
the case law "in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to 
challenge the conditions of their confinement." See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. Because 
inmates cannot know or understand some of the time requirements and limitations 
involved in attacking their sentences or challenging the conditions of their confinement 
without access to case law, the prison law library's lack of access to case law means 
that it does not confer the guaranteed "capability of bringing contemplated challenges to 
sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts." See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356. 
Thus, the State did not furnish an adequate law library. 
Further, Mr. Hill asserts that the State did not furnish adequate assistance from 
persons trained in the law because the prison "paralegals" are prohibited to give legal 
advice. The State argues that Mr. Hill has not cited "any authority that actually supports 
his assertion that the [C]onstituton requires prisons to have individuals available who 
can give legal advice." (Resp. Br., p.18.) Bounds and its progeny, which demonstrate 
that the right of access to the courts contemplates that "adequate assistance from 
persons trained in the law" requires the provision of legal advice, refute the 
State's argument. 
As examined in Mr. Hill's Appellant's Brief (App. Br., p.20), the United States 
Supreme Court in Bounds discussed, as an alternative to adequate law libraries, 
programs providing "some degree of professional or quasi-professional legal assistance 
to prisoners" as a method to assure meaningful access to the courts. Bounds, 430 U.S. 
at 830-31. Some of the "many imaginative forms" of these programs involved inmate 
paralegal assistants, paraprofessionals, law students, and lawyers-persons all capable 
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of providing legal advice. See id. at 831. Further, the Court expressly contemplated the 
provision of legal advice through the use of "[i]ndependent legal advisors" who could 
"mediate or resolve administratively many prisoner complaints that would otherwise 
burden the courts" and "convince inmates that other grievances against the prison or 
the legal system are ill-founded .... " Id. at 831. Later in Bounds, the Court used 
"trained legal advisors" to describe "adequate assistance from persons trained in the 
law." Id. at 833 (emphasis added); see Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 97 (2d 
Cir. 2004). 
While the Bounds Court stated that "a legal access program need not include any 
particular element we have discussed," Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832, it also explained that 
"[a]ny plan . . . must be evaluated as a whole to ascertain its compliance with 
constitutional standards." Id. Although the legal assistance programs discussed in 
Bounds included a wide variety of elements, the programs all incorporated some sort of 
provision of legal advice in order to comply with constitutional standards. 
Despite the State's arguments, Lewis renewed the emphasis on a constitutionally 
adequate legal assistance program's provision of legal advice. As recognized by the 
State (Resp. Br., p.19), the Lewis Court noted with approval, as an alternative to law 
libraries, a legal assistance program involving "some minimal access to legal advice and 
a system of court-provided forms." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 352 (emphasis added). Thus, 
the Court's approval of a legal assistance program involving some minimal access to 
legal advice is inconsistent with the State's contention that "[t]he access afforded to 
[Mr.] Hill was more than adequate to satisfy his constitutional right to access" (Resp. 
Br., p.19), because Mr. Hill did not have any access to legal advice. 
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Cases from other jurisdictions also indicate that a legal assistance program, to be 
constitutionally adequate, must somehow include the provision of legal advice to 
inmates. See, e.g., Bourdon, 386 F.3d at 93 (confirming "that the appointment of 
counsel can be a valid means of satisfying a prisoner's right of access to the courts"); 
Smith v. Bounds, 813 F.2d 1299, 1302 (4th Cir. 1987) (observing that, "Once the state 
foreclosed the remedy of law libraries, the remaining choice was obvious. The 
alternative to a system of libraries was some form of assistance to prisoners from 
trained attorneys"); Williams v. Wyrick, 747 F.2d 1231, 1232 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) 
( concluding that an inmate did not show a denial of access to the courts, where twenty-
three inmates on death row had been assigned two inmate paralegals and one runner 
to procure law books, copy portions of legal materials, and research legal questions for 
the inmates); Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that a 
system making "lawyers regularly available to prisoners for consultation and advice ... 
adequately insures that prisoners will have their claims reviewed and presented to the 
courts"); see also Koerschner v. Warden, 508 F. Supp. 2d 849, 853, 860-61 (D. Nev. 
2007) (observing that "where ... there is no functionally significant law library access, 
something more in the nature of 'active assistance' by persons with some actual 
meaningful training in the law may be required," and expressing skepticism as to 
whether the "active assistance" by minimally-qualified inmate law library assistants, who 
were able to field litigation questions from inmates and complete legal research, was 
from persons trained in the law); Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530, 536 (Ct. App. 1997) 
("Without either access to Idaho legal reference books, with which to research their 
rights and prepare their own pleadings, or the availability of representation by persons 
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trained in Idaho law and procedure, prisoners would find the Art. I,§ 18 guarantee that 
'courts of justice shall be open to every person,' a hollow promise."). 
While most of the above legal assistance programs did not go so far as to 
"effectively demand permanent provision of counsel," which is not required by the 
Constitution, see Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354, they all included the provision of some level of 
legal advice by persons trained in the law. The programs did not feature any particular 
common element, but providing some form of "trained legal advisors" is necessary to 
meet the constitutional standards for an adequate legal assistance program. See 
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832-33. 
Like an adequate law library, an adequate legal assistance program-through 
the provision of at least "some minimal access to legal advice"-confers the guaranteed 
"capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of 
confinement before the courts." See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356. Because the prison 
paralegals here were prohibited from providing any legal advice, the legal assistance 
program did not confer the guaranteed "capability of filing suit." See id. Thus, the State 
failed to furnish adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. 
The guarantee acknowledged in Bounds and Lewis is disjunctive: the "capability 
of filing suit" may be provided either through furnishing "adequate law libraries or 
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356; 
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828; see also Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1003 (6th Cir. 1992) 
("It is noteworthy that Bounds refers to law libraries or other forms of legal assistance, in 
the disjunctive, no fewer than five times." (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Cepulonis v. Fair, 732 F .2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1984) ("Bounds does not create an entitlement 
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to legal aid assistance if library access is otherwise constitutionally adequate."). Thus, 
the State's arguments that requiring the provision of legal advice for legal assistance 
programs to be adequate would invalidate law libraries as an alternative (Resp. 
Br., pp.19-20), have already been rejected by the courts. If a prison were to confer "the 
capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of 
confinement before the courts" through furnishing adequate law libraries, it would not 
need to additionally furnish legal advice as part of an adequate legal assistance 
program. See, e.g., Lewis, 518 U.S. at 356; Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. However, 
because of the myriad deficiencies here, the State furnished neither an adequate law 
library nor adequate legal assistance from persons trained in the law. 
2. Mr. Hill Suffered An Actual Injury, Because His Post-Conviction Petition 
Was Dismissed With Prejudice As A Result Of The State's Failure To 
Furnish An Adequate Law Library Or Legal Assistance Program 
Mr. Hill asserts that he suffered an actual injury because his case was dismissed 
with prejudice as a result of the deficiencies in the prison law library and legal 
assistance program. The State argues that Mr. Hill has not shown that he suffered any 
actual injury as a result of the shortcomings in the prison's access to courts programs. 
(Resp. Br., pp.19-23.) However, Lewis indicates that Mr. Hill has shown that he 
suffered an actual injury. 
In Lewis, the United States Supreme Court explained that an inmate may suffer 
an actual injury where "a complaint he prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy 
some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal 
assistance facilities, he could not have known." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Indeed, the 
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Lewis Court later found that a prisoner whose lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice 
suffered an actual injury. Id. at 356-57. 
Like the inmate's lawsuit in Lewis, Mr. Hill's post-conviction petition here was 
dismissed with prejudice. (R., pp.275, 277.) Because of the deficiencies in the prison 
law library and legal assistance program, Mr. Hill had no way of knowing that he had to 
file a post-conviction petition in order to raise the legal challenges he wished to make. 
(See Tr., p.37, L.25 - p.39, L.4.) Because Mr. Hill did not know to file a post-conviction 
petition, he did not know the time constraints set by the relevant statute of limitations. 
Because Mr. Hill did not know about the statute of limitations, his case was dismissed 
with prejudice. Thus, Mr. Hill suffered an actual injury. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. 
Although the State suggests that Mr. Hill did not suffer an actual injury because 
this case somehow falls outside the guarantee of the right of access to the courts (see 
Resp. Br., p.20), that suggestion is unsupported. Mr. Hill does not seek to transform 
himself into a "litigating engine[]capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative 
actions to slip-and-fall claims." See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. Rather, in this post-
conviction action, Mr. Hill seeks "[t]he tools [Bounds] requires to be provided ... those 
that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in 
order to challenge the conditions of their confinement." See id. His post-conviction 
petition falls squarely within the matters covered by the "capability of filing suit" 
guaranteed by the Constitution. See id. 
Further, while the Court in Lewis disclaimed those statements from Bounds that 
"appear to suggest that the State must enable the prisoner to discover grievances, and 
to litigate effectively once in court," Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354 (citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 
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825-26 & n.14) (emphasis in original), Mr. Hill does not assert that the State was 
required to enable him to discover a grievance. Mr. Hill already knew that he had a 
grievance against his trial counsel before he knew to file a post-conviction petition to 
pursue that grievance, as shown by his statement that "the only reason I know about a 
post conviction is I was talking to a gentleman about how my lawyer, my lawyer got me." 
(See Tr., p.37, L.25 - p.38, L.2.) Mr. Hill only submits that the deficiencies in the law 
library and legal assistance program "hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim" based 
on the grievance. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. 
The State's argument that Mr. Hill did not suffer an actual injury, because the 
relevant "information was made available to [Mr. Hill] regardless of whether it was 
constitutionally compelled" through the post-conviction packet (see Resp. Br., p.21), is 
also unavailing. While the post-conviction packet mentions "[p]etitioner received the 
ineffective assistance of counsel" and "[p]etitioner's plea was not knowingly or 
voluntarily entered" as two of the possible grounds for post-conviction relief (R., p.112), 
it does not follow that this information precluded Mr. Hill from suffering an actual injury. 
Although the State contends that mere "[a]ssistance on how to access the 
courts ... is the right protected by the Constitution" (Resp. Br., p.19 (emphasis in 
original)), "meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone" of "the right vindicated by 
Bounds." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 
Thus, in Lewis the Court held that two inmates with language problems suffered actual 
injuries, despite the prison's claim that it was not responsible for any lack of access to 
the courts experienced by the two inmates because it had met its constitutional 
obligations through providing "physical access to excellent libraries, plus help from legal 
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assistants and law clerks." Id. at 356-57 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because 
the Constitution "guarantees no particular methodology but rather the conferral of ... 
the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of 
confinement before the courts," id. at 356, the existence of the libraries and legal 
assistance program did not preclude the two inmates in Lewis from suffering actual 
injuries. Their actionable claims of that nature had been rejected or prevented because 
the guaranteed "capability of filing suit" had not been provided to them. See id. at 356. 
Similarly, even with the existence of the post-conviction packet here, Mr. Hill 
suffered an actual injury. His post-conviction petition was dismissed with prejudice as a 
result of the deficiencies in the prison law library and legal assistance program, i.e., 
because the guaranteed capability of filing suit had not been provided to him. See id. 
at 356. Because of the deficiencies in the prison law library and legal assistance 
program, Mr. Hill had no way of knowing that he had to file a post-conviction petition, or 
even request a post-conviction packet, in order to raise the legal challenges he wished 
to make. Although Mr. Hill was given the List of Litigation Self-help Packets 
(hereinafter, the List), and the List states that the post-conviction packet is available to 
inmates, the List does not explain that a post-conviction petition may be used to raise 
the ineffective assistance of counsel or knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea 
arguments that Mr. Hill had in mind. (See R., p.255.) 
Case law, not the text of I.C. § 19-4901 itself, explains that such arguments may 
be raised in post-conviction. See I.C. § 19-4901; Parrott v. State, 117 Idaho 272, 274 
(1990). However, the prison law library did not provide inmates with any access to case 
law. Further, because the prison paralegals were prohibited to provide any legal advice, 
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they would not have been able to explain to Mr. Hill that those arguments may be raised 
in a post-conviction petition. (See Exs., p.1 (a prison paralegal, responding to Mr. Hill's 
statement that "I also need to know what I need to research to find out what a post 
conviction is," wrote, "Paralegal cannot give legal advice").) 1 Thus, Mr. Hill had no way 
to know that he needed to file a post-conviction petition, or even request a post-
conviction packet, to pursue the claims he wanted to make. 
While there was testimony that the Idaho Code volumes available to inmates are 
annotated with case cites "where that's applicable" (see Tr., p.84, Ls.17-21), there is no 
evidence on this record to support the State's argument (see Resp. Br., p.22), that the 
version of I.C. § 19-4901 available to inmates is annotated with sections entitled 
"Grounds for Relief" and "Ineffective Assistance of Counsel." Additionally, even if the 
version of Section 19-4901 available to inmates were annotated as the State contends, 
Mr. Hill would not have been able to find the post-conviction statute or any annotations 
based on the information provided in the List. The List states, "Post conviction relief is 
available only on specific grounds as outlined in Idaho Code § 4901 [sic]." (R., p.255.) 
Because the List uses an incomplete citation for the post-conviction statute, Mr. Hill was 
unable to know which volume of the Idaho Code to consult to find any annotations or 
otherwise learn whether the legal challenges he wished to raise were among the 
grounds for post-conviction relief. (See R., p.255.) Inmates are required to request the 
books they want to check out by title. (Tr., p.57, Ls.16-20, p.85, Ls.6-9.) Because the 
List does not state that the post-conviction statute is part of Title 19 of the Idaho Code, 
Mr. Hill could not have known the proper title to request so he could read the statute 
1 This citation refers to the 172-page electronic document "Supreme Court No. 40570-
2012 Exhibits.pdf." 
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and learn the grounds for post-conviction relief. Thus, Mr. Hill would have been unable 
to consult Title 19 of the Idaho Code or Section 19-4901, even if he had attempted to 
request them from the paralegals. (See Tr., p.57, Ls.16-20.) 
The deficiencies in the prison's law library and legal assistance program left 
Mr. Hill with no way of knowing that he had to file a post-conviction petition in order to 
raise the legal challenges he wished to make. Because Mr. Hill did not know to file a 
post-conviction petition, he did not know the time constraints set by the relevant statute 
of limitations, and his case was dismissed with prejudice. Put otherwise, he has shown 
that he suffered an actual injury because his post-conviction conviction "was dismissed 
for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the 
prison's legal assistance facilities, he could not have known." See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 
351. Mr. Hill has "demonstrate[d] that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal 
assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim." Id. at 351. 
In sum, the State did not confer the guaranteed capability of filing suit, because it 
failed to furnish an adequate law library or adequate assistance from persons trained in 
the law. Mr. Hill suffered an actual injury from those deficiencies because his post-
conviction petition was dismissed with prejudice as a result of the State's failure to 
furnish adequate law libraries or adequate legal assistance. Thus, Mr. Hill has 
demonstrated that his right of meaningful access to the courts was denied. See Lewis, 
518 U.S. 343; Bounds, 430 U.S. 817. 
Because Mr. Hill, for purposes of the Bounds standard, has demonstrated that 
his right of access to the courts was denied, he has also demonstrated that equitable 
tolling applies to the statute of limitations in his post-conviction proceeding. See 
18 
Ochieng, 147 Idaho at 626, Martinez, 130 Idaho at 535-36. Thus, the district court erred 
when it dismissed with prejudice Mr. Hill's petition for post-conviction relief, because 
Mr. Hill was denied his right of access to the courts and equitable tolling 
therefore applies. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hill 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's memorandum opinion and 
judgment dismissing with prejudice his petition for post-conviction relief, and remand the 
case for further proceedings on the merits of Mr. Hill's petition. 
DATED this 21 st day of January, 2014. 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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